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In the context of a discussion on certainty, the goal of 
this paper is to be a sound in law1 for attention to the 
European Commission’s (Commission) “Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament (EP) and of 
the Council on a Common European Sales Law” (the 
proposed CESL)2. This paper questions whether the 
Commission’s choice to base its proposal on Art. 114 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) is appropriate.
The proposal is in the form of a regulation rather 
than a directive. Preceded by a short Explanatory 
Memorandum of about a dozen pages, the proposal has 
two main parts: firstly, the actual Regulation intended 
to give effect to the CESL, i.e. 37 Recitals and 16 Articles 
drafted by Commission officials (sometimes termed “le 
chapeau”), and concerning the scope of the application 
of the instrument, its optional character, its relationship 
to existing private international law instruments and 
the mechanisms to make it applicable and secondly, 
the actual “CESL” as an Annex to the Regulation, 
comprising 186 Articles and two appendices. It 
is a long and complex document, encompassing 
provisions governing much of contract law as well as 
specific provisions for the three types of contracts, 
which it would govern. The Commission claims that 
this proposal creates an optional, autonomous second 
national (sales) law regime, to be used initially in cross-
(*) This paper is wholeheartedly dedicated to my beloved father, Halit 
Ekim, without whom I would not be who and where I am today. 
1 WERRO, F. et al., “The Common Core Sound: Short Notes on 
Themes, Harmonies and Disharmonies of European Tort Law”, King‘s 
Law Journal, V.20, 2009-ssrn.com/abstract=1452658, p. 255.
2 COM (2011) 635 final, 11.10.2011.
Can a Common European Sales Law be based on 
Art. 114 TFEU? While the proposal for a Common 
European Sales Law is making its way through the 
EU’s legislative process, the author criticizes the 
weakness of its chosen legal basis and demonstrates 
the risk associated with relying on the wrong basis.  
Abstract provided by the Editorial Board
The Common European Sales Law:
Aiming for the stars, but hitting the ground with reality?
Mine Ekim (Class of 2012-2013 Master of Laws (LL.M.) in Cross-Cultural Business Practice, University of Fribourg; 
Attorney-at-law admitted to Istanbul Bar Association and Union of Turkish Bar Associations)(*)
border business-to-consumer contracts and business-
to-business contracts involving at least one small and 
medium-sized enterprise.
Legal Basis: Questionable?
As a legislative act under Art. 288/1 TFEU, a directive 
or regulation requires a legal basis under the principle 
of conferral enshrined in Art. 5 Treaty of EU. As there 
is no specific legal basis endowing the Union with 
competence to legislate generally across the field of 
contract law, the Treaties governing the Union provide 
no specific competence to create optional contract 
law legal rules.3 The choice of legal basis is of great 
importance, among others, for the following reasons: 
it determines the procedure for adopting legislative 
instruments in the EU (whether a qualified majority of 
votes4 or unanimity in the Council is required, as well 
as what the role of the EP is in shaping the measure) 
and also, if the wrong legal basis is chosen, the measure 
is in danger of being challenged before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and annulled by 
it. 
As opposed to the initial proposals set out in the Green 
Paper of July 2010, the proposed CESL is devised as an 
optional instrument that no longer aims to harmonize 
the national sales laws of the Member States by 
“requiring amendments to the pre-existing national 
sales law”, but by “creating within each Member State’s 
national law a second sales law regime for contracts 
covered by its scope that is identical throughout the 
EU” and that “will exist alongside the pre-existing 
rules of national contract law”5– so, seemingly leaving 
Member States’ laws intact or unaffected. Bearing this 
in mind, the appropriateness of the Commission’s 
3 DALHUISEN, J., “Some Realism about a Common European Sales 
Law”, EBLR, V.24/3, 2013-ssrn.com/abstract=2157397, p. 314.
4 This would mean that no single Member State can effectively veto. 
5 DANNEMANN, G. & VOGENAUER, S. (eds.), The Common 
European Sales Law in Context – Interactions with English and 
German Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 21-81. 
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choice6 of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for an 
optional instrument like the proposed CESL is worth 
questioning. Can the proposed CESL be characterized 
as a measure for the “approximation of the measures 
laid down by law […] in Member States” within the 
meaning of Art. 114 TFEU?7
The proposed CESL purports to be based on Art. 
114 TFEU.8 The question of appropriate legal basis 
was widely debated already before the Commission’s 
proposal was presented and several other treaty 
bases (notably Articles 81, 169 and 352 TFEU) were 
speculated upon prior to its publication. Previous 
studies9 have meticulously considered and eliminated 
the appropriateness of Articles 81 and 169 TFEU, 
covering procedural rules and consumer protection 
respectively. The potential remaining legal bases are 
Articles 114 and 352 TFEU. Within the meaning of 
Art. 114 TFEU,10 the term “approximate” suggests 
some manner of harmonization or replacement of 
Member State laws.11 In accordance with this Article, 
the Union may adopt “measures for the approximation 
of the provisions […] in Member States which have 
as their object the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market” and accordingly, it empowers 
the Union to harmonize national legal provisions by 
way of a directive, or even to replace national law by 
way of a regulation. In contrast, Art. 114 TFEU does 
not empower the Union to introduce a legal regime 
of Union law that supplements national law without 
harmonizing or replacing it. Therefore, a legislative 
act, which does not aim to achieve approximation of 
the existing national laws but instead leaves existing 
6 EP has been a constant supporter of the proposed CESL whereas the 
Council and a number of Member States’ parliaments (e.g. Austrian and 
German parliaments) have questioned the merit of Union intervention 
beyond reform of the consumer acquis and into the area of facilitative 
contract law. LOW, G., “Unitas via Diversitas: Can the Common 
European Sales Law Harmonize Through Diversity?”, Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law, V.1, 2012-ssrn.com/
abstract=1991070, p. 133.
7 This paper leaves aside whether the other requirements of Art. 114 
TFEU are met. For this, see the reasoned opinions of the Belgian, 
Swedish and UK Parliaments, ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/document/
COM20110635FIN.do.
8 LOW, G., supra note 6, p. 132; KUIPERS, J. J., “The Legal Basis 
For a European Optional Instrument”, ERPL, V.19/5, 2011, pp. 545-
564.
9 Particularly KUIPERS, J. J., supra note 8, pp. 549-560.
10 Since Art. 114/1 TFEU refers to “measures”, in principle, any form 
of EU measure can be adopted provided that the measure is for the 
approximation of national law or administrative practice and with the 
aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal market.
11 LOW, G., supra note 6, p. 136.
national laws untouched, cannot be done under 
Art. 114 TFEU. Paragraph 3 of the same article lays 
down that the Commission should base its proposals 
concerning, inter alia, consumer protection on a “high 
level of protection”.
There is well-established European Court case law,12 
which holds that creating a new legal form to exist 
alongside existing legal forms under national law 
rights, does not amount to approximating national law 
and cannot be based on Art. 114 TFEU. In the Opinion 
1/94 paragraph 59, the CJEU drew a distinction 
between the harmonization of national intellectual 
property law, which can be based on now Art. 114 and 
creating “new rights superimposed on national rights” 
cannot be based on now Art. 114. This distinction has 
been applied in subsequent case law on patents and 
the unavailability of Art. 114 TFEU as a legal basis for 
creating European law forms of intellectual property 
and was recognized by the Member States when they 
introduced, through the Treaty of Lisbon, a new legal 
basis for measures creating European intellectual 
property rights in Art. 118 TFEU.13 In a different 
context, the same distinction was applied in the 
creation of the European Cooperative Society (SCE).14 
The CJEU held that Council Regulation 1435/2003 
established the Statute for SCE, an optional pan-
Union corporate entity that, while obviating the need 
for incorporation in any single Member State, did not 
per se harmonize or replace the latter’s company laws. 
Therefore, creating a European form of cooperative 
society to exist alongside national cooperative societies 
was correctly adopted on the basis of the residual power 
in what is now Art. 352 TFEU and could not have been 
based on Art. 114 TFEU. Implicit in the judgment is 
the Court’s rejection of the application for annulment 
12 BCEW, 01.2012, barcouncil.org.uk/media/112927/bar_council_
of_e_w_preliminary_views_on_cesl_legal_basis_-_january_2012.
pdf and 05.2012, barcouncil.org.uk/media/159762/barcouncilof_
england___wales__response_to_moj__bis_call_on_cesl__
may2012final.pdf.
13 BCEW, supra note 12, 01.2012, p. 3; position also shared by 
the Austrian Federal Council European Affairs Committee, 2011, 
parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/BR/I-BR/I-BR_08609/fname_237038.
pdf and by the German Bundestag Committee on Legal Affairs, 2011, 
dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/080/1708000.pdf.
14 Case 436/03, EP v. Council, ERC I-3733, 2.5.2006. BASEDOW, J. 
et al., “Policy Options for Progress Towards a European Contract Law: 
Comments on the issues raised in the Green Paper from the Commission 
of 1 July 2010, COM (2010) 348 final”, RabelsZ, V.75/2, 2011-ssrn.
com/abstract=1752985, p. 388 vs. MICKLITZ, H. W. & REICH, N., 
“The Commission Proposal for a ‘Regulation on a Common European 
Sales Law (CESL)’ - Too Broad or Not Broad Enough?”, EUI Working 
Papers LAW N.2012/04, 2012, pp. 1-87-ssrn.com/abstract=2013183.
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that any measure seeking to merely overcome the 
problems of legal diversity to the internal market is 
sufficient to trigger the use of Art. 114 TFEU. To reason 
otherwise is to render the term “approximate” otiose.15 
The Court found that the SCE was a new legal form; it 
existed alongside cooperative societies formed under 
national law; which was left “unchanged”; it had its 
own specific characteristics; it left certain matters to be 
governed by local national law, but these matters were 
of “subsidiary nature” and subsidiary national law was 
not harmonized by the contested regulation.16 
The proposed CESL claims to be a “single uniform set 
of contract law rules” which “should be interpreted 
autonomously in accordance with the well-established 
principles on the interpretation of Union law” and 
“should cover the matters of contract law that are of 
practical relevance during the life cycle of the types 
of contracts falling within the material and personal 
scope”. Where the parties have validly agreed to use 
the proposed CESL for a contract, “only the CESL 
shall govern the matters addressed in its rules” and 
“all the matters of a contractual and non-contractual 
nature not addressed in the CESL are governed by the 
pre-existing rules of the national law”. Just like the 
European intellectual property rights and the SCE, the 
proposed CESL will exist alongside national contract 
law, which will be unchanged: neither be harmonized 
nor replaced. It cannot turn itself into a regulation 
that harmonizes (or, in the language of Art. 114 TFEU 
“approximates”) national law simply by claiming in its 
preamble that that is what it does.17 The Commission 
argues that the proposed CESL approximates18 
national law by “creating within each Member State’s 
national law a second sales law regime”, however this 
argument does not displace the conclusion that it is a 
new legal form in addition to19 the national systems of 
contract law. Notwithstanding any convergence due 
to regulatory competition, the very co-existence of 
these two sets of rules militates against the conclusion 
that the purely national law is itself changed.20 If the 
15 LOW, G., supra note 6, p. 137.
16 Case 436/03, supra note 14, paras 40-46.
17 BCEW, supra note 12, 01.2012, p. 5. 
18 MICKLITZ, H. W. & REICH, N., supra note 14, p. 5 vs. 
BASEDOW, J., “Fakultatives Unionsprivatrecht oder: Grundlagen des 
28. Modells”, Festschrift für Dr. Dres. Franz Jürgen Säcker, Munich, 
C.H. Beck, 2012, p. 38. 
19 Comparatively, Case 436/03, supra note 14, para 40: “the contested 
regulation that it aims to introduce a new legal form in addition to the 
national forms of cooperative societies”.
20 LOW, G., supra note 6, p. 146.
proposed CESL were to be adopted under Art. 114 
TFEU, it would clearly be a measure of EU law having 
no impact upon national law as it leaves the national 
systems of contract law intact or unaffected – meaning 
that this measure could not be regarded as one that 
approximates the national contract laws. Consequently, 
the appropriateness of Art. 114 TFEU, as the legal basis 
of the proposed CESL, can give rise to doubts.21 
To this date, the Union’s legislative practice proves that 
any legal instrument or legal form of Community law,22 
which exists in parallel to corresponding national 
laws without changing or replacing them, have not 
been based on Art. 114 TFEU, but on Art. 352 TFEU. 
Art. 352 TFEU provides for a different legislative 
procedure23 which requires unanimity in the Council 
“after obtaining the consent of the EP” whereas the 
ordinary legislative procedure of Art. 114 TFEU allows 
majority voting with the full participation of the EP. If 
it turns out that Art. 114 is not the correct legal basis 
and given that there is no specific Union competence 
in the area of contract law, then it may be concluded 
that the Treaties have not provided the necessary 
powers to adopt an optional instrument and that Art. 
352 TFEU remains the sole legitimate basis for the 
proposed CESL.24 However, if the EU now decides to 
base an optional contract law on Art. 114 TFEU, then 
the rationale for the use of Art. 352 in all other past 
(and future) optional regimes might be called into 
question25 and potentially challenged as being based 
on the wrong competence. In the near future, this issue 
will be a topic of discussion,26 if not dissent, and thus 
it will undermine the credibility of the proposed CESL 
unless and until the CJEU has given judgment on the 
issue.
21 BCEW, supra note 12, 01.2012, p. 8.
22 E.g. Council Regulation (EEC) N.2137/85, 25.7.1985, OJ L 199/1-
1985; Council Regulation (EC) N.40/94, 20.12.1993, OJ L 11/1-1994; 
Council Regulation (EC) N.2157/2001, 8.10.2001, OJ L 294/1-2001; 
Council Regulation (EC) N.1435/200, 22.7.2003, OJ L 207/1-2003.
23 HESSELINK, M., “The Case for a Common European Sales Law 
in an Age of Rising Nationalism”, ERCL, V.8/3, 2012, pp. 342-366-
ssrn.com/abstract=1998174 vs. GRUNDMANN, S., “CESL, Legal 
Nationalism or a Plea for Appropriate Governance?” ERCL, V.8/3, 
2012, pp. 241-244.
24 LOW, G., supra note 6, p. 136; BASEDOW, J. et al., supra note 14, 
pp. 388-389; ROTH, W-H., “Der ‘Vorschlag für eine Verordnung über 
ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht’-KOM (2011) 635 endg’”, 
EWS, V.1, 2012, pp. 16-19.
25  Ibid., supra note 6, p. 147.
26  E.g. Council of the EU, 7-8.6.2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-12-241_en.htm?locale=en, p. 20.
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